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DO NOT PASS GO, DO NOT COLLECT $231
MILLION DOLLARS: HOW NCAA V. GOVERNOR
OF NEW JERSEY COULD NEGATIVELYAFFECT
NEVADA’S MONOPOLY ON SPORTS BETTING
Kyle Wyant*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three years, there has been a highly publicized and ongoing
struggle in New Jersey: the state legislators have been fighting to legalize
sports betting, yet the Third Circuit Federal Courts have continuously stopped
these legislators cold in their tracks.1 The federal court has struck down
multiple New Jersey constitutional amendments because the court holds these
amendments are in violation of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (hereinafter, “PASPA”).2 PASPA, passed in 1992, is the federal statute that
all but completely outlawed sports gambling.3 However, four states—Nevada,
Delaware, Montana, and Oregon—are still able to legally generate revenue
from sports gambling4 because of grandfather provisions in PASPA.5 Further,
out of the four states, only Nevada was entitled to operate a full state-sponsored
sports wagering scheme.6 The other states, however, were only allowed to
implement the sports betting schemes they already had in existence—this
meant that Delaware, Montana, and Oregon were only allowed to implement

* I would like to thank primarily the love of my life, Chantel, and my family for
supporting me in everything I do as well as understanding the work that is required
for this note. I also want to express my gratitude to the UNLV Gaming Law Journal
Staff for, without them, this work would not be possible.
1
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, (Christie I Dist. Ct.) 926 F. Supp.
2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J.
(Christie I), 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Governor of N.J. (Christie II), 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (decision vacated
2015).
2
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016).
3
Id.
4
Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA):
A Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287–88 (2011).
5
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a) (2016).
6
Meer, supra note 4 at 288.
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limited sports wagering in the form of lotteries because those states did not
previously allow for a full sports wagering scheme.7 Additionally, PASPA did
allow an exception for New Jersey if the state enacted a sports gambling
scheme within one year after the effective date of PASPA.8 However, New
Jersey failed to do so,9 leaving Nevada in sole possession of the only fully
functional legalized sports betting system in the country.10 This monopoly is
the only legal game in town concerning the United States sports betting market,
where illegal sports betting is estimated to be worth somewhere between $80
and $380 billion annually.11
While PASPA may explicitly prohibit legal sports betting in New Jersey, it
is unclear whether this law will stay on the books forever. Some critics of
PASPA have argued that the law is unconstitutional12 or that the legalization of
sports betting is a zone of experimentation solely for the states.13 Other critics
have argued that PASPA is now outdated and should be repealed.14
Additionally, critics suggest that PASPA is not accomplishing what it set out to
do, as a recent 2015 study showed that people wager $95 billion on football
games alone, with only $2 billion being wagered legally.15 Critics also argue
that public policy favors PASPA’s demise. These arguments include how
legalizing sports betting will provide a new form of taxable income to
governments, how there will be more state regulation of a prominent illegal

Id. at 288–89. Oregon has given up its right to operate a sports lottery in order to
host NCAA tournament games and Montana has similarly ceased its sports
lottery—thus only Delaware and Nevada remain as states with any form of
legalized sports wagering.
8
Id. at 289.
9
Id.; a debate between legislators ultimately prevented New Jersey from
implementing legislation during this one-year period. Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling
Debate Rages Anew Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anew-oversports.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
10
Meer, supra note 4, at 288.
11
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, 2–14 (1999), http://govinfo.
library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf.
12
See Thomas L. Skinner III, Note, The Pendulum Swings: Commerce Clause and
Tenth Amendment Challenges to PASPA, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 311, 342 (2011).
13
See Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate): The
Case for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY.
L.J. 163, 170 (2010–2011).
14
See Meer, supra note 4, at 308–09; see also Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off:
Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 591, 594–95 (2013); Jason Goldstein, Note, Take
the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Integrity of the Game, 11
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 375–76 (2012).
15
Thomas Barrabi, Legalized Sports Gambling? Americans To Bet $95 Billion On
NFL, College Football This Season, Mostly Illegally, Group Says, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ legalized-sportsgambling-americans-bet-95-billion-nfl-college-football-season-mostly-2089606.
7
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activity, and how legalizing sports betting will create even higher fan interest,
boosting revenue for sporting leagues such as the National Basketball
Association (hereinafter, “NBA”).16 Further, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed to vacate its latest August 25, 2015
decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association (hereinafter, “NCAA”) v.
Governor of New Jersey and re-hear oral arguments en banc.17 The rare
occurrence of vacating an already published opinion shows that New Jersey’s
(as well as other states’) hopes of legalizing sports gambling may still be alive
and well.18
With the wide social outcry against PASPA, it will unlikely remain good
law forever, and until the United States Supreme Court rules on the debate
regarding the issues, speculation is necessary.19 Therefore, this note will
discuss the potential ramifications for Nevada if Congress were to repeal
PASPA or if the Supreme Court would declare PASPA unconstitutional today.
This note will divide its analysis into three parts. Part I will examine why
Congress enacted PASPA, why PASPA likely no longer is accomplishing its
purpose, and why Congress is likely to repeal it. Part I will also analyze some
of the more persuasive arguments regarding PASPA’s constitutionality, giving
reasons why the Supreme Court may declare PASPA unconstitutional when it
inevitably grants certiorari.
Part II begins with a brief history of the New Jersey arguments that have
yet to succeed in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the case line of
NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey. Part II will then explain why New Jersey is
so adamant about trying to legalize sports betting. Finally, Part II will delve
into the aspects surrounding New Jersey’s economic decline, specifically in
Atlantic City, and the major reasons underlying the decline.20
Part III analyzes what the potential ramifications may be in Nevada if
sports betting were to become legal nationwide. This analysis will primarily
come from a comparison between Nevada’s current monopoly in the sports
betting world and New Jersey’s past monopoly in gambling in the Northeast.
Part III will then identify the differences between Nevada and New Jersey and
explain why this author believes Nevada will see a decline in revenue
Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown: Stern Open to Legalized Betting, Rule
Changes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.si.com/moresports/2009/12/11/weekly-countdown.
17
Joe Drape, Appeals Court to Rehear New Jersey Sports Betting Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/sports/appeals-courtto-rehear-new-jersey-sports-betting-case.html?ref=topics&_r=0; see Christie II 799
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated.
18
Drape, supra note 17.
19
It must be noted that the Supreme Court did have an opportunity to grant
certiorari in Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), but declined to do so. Christie
v. Governor of N.J., 134 S.Ct. 2866 (2014). However, with the new Christie II, 799
F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), the Supreme Court may grant certiorari in the future.
20
See infra Section II.B.
16
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stemming from sports betting.
I. OVERVIEW OF PASPA AND THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST IT
A. Legislative History
In 1992, Congress passed PASPA, which states:
It shall be unlawful for. . .a governmental entity. . .or a person to sponsor,
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law of compact of a
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur
or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
21
more performances of such athletes in such games.

Ironically enough, one of the bill’s primary sponsors was a Senator from
New Jersey, Bill Bradley.22 The legislative history of PASPA shows that a
primary reason behind enacting PASPA was to “stop the spread of statesponsored sports gambling and to maintain the integrity of our national
pastime,” with national pastime referring to all amateur and professional
sports.23 The fear of sporting events losing integrity is not unfounded. For
example, in 1989, three years prior to the enactment of PASPA, reports
surfaced alleging that Pete Rose,24 manager of the Cincinnati Reds at the time,
had gambled on baseball games.25 After the allegations, Major League Baseball
(hereinafter, “MLB”) had hired an independent investigator who discovered
evidence revealing that Pete Rose did in fact bet on baseball games.26 In August
of 1989, MLB Commissioner Bart Giamatti suspended Pete Rose for life,
making him only the fifteenth player in baseball history to receive a lifetime
ban.27
On February 22, 1991, only a year and a half later, the Senate introduced
Bill 474,28 which would eventually become PASPA. The most notable
proponents of the Bill included league commissioners from all four of the

28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016).
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991); FSB Assoc., BILL BRADLEY,
http://www.billbradley.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
23
S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 4.
24
Pete Rose Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (Oct. 5, 2016, 4:43PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/us/pete-rose-fast-facts/ (as of October 5, 2016,
Pete Rose holds the Major League Baseball Record for the most games played and
the most hits in a career).
25
Pete Rose, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM http://www.biography.com/people/pete-rose39483 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
26
Id.
27
Pete Rose Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, Supra note 24. For a further glimpse into
the life of Pete Rose, see PETE ROSE, MY PRISON WITHOUT BARS (2004).
28
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991).
21
22
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major sports in America.29 During the subcommittee process, the National
Football League (hereinafter, “NFL”) commissioner at the time, Paul
Tagliabue, testified, “Sports gambling threatens the character of team
sports. . ..[W]ith legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to
represent the fast buck,” and the games “would change forever—and for the
worse.”30 Not only did the NFL commissioner testify, but also the
commissioners of the NBA, MLB, and the general counsel and vice president
of the National Hockey League (hereinafter, “NHL”) all testified to the
negative ramifications of sports gambling.31 This testimony, coupled with the
recent Pete Rose scandal, led Congress to adopt PASPA, stating, “Sports
gambling threatens the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur and
professional sports. Widespread legalization of sports gambling would
inevitably promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead fans to think
‘the fix was in’ whenever their team failed to beat the point spread.”32
While the integrity of professional sports was the primary concern behind
PASPA, it was not the only driving force behind the legislation. When
Congress held congressional hearings on PASPA, thirteen states were
considering legalized sports gambling.33 Because of the pending consideration
of the states concerning sports-gambling legalization, Congress (pressured by
the major sports commissioners) felt that if it did not act proactively, it would
be impossible to undo the damages retroactively.34 Congress stated that the
states could not adequately protect the country from the moral harms
underlying sports gambling and that federal intervention was necessary.35
One of the major moral harms concerning states was that they could not
prevent the spread of gambling among the Nation’s youth.36 Congress
identified that young people in America love sports, and stated that allowing
nationwide sports gambling would diminish the values that sports instill in
America’s youth.37 Congress further noted, during the discussion of PASPA,
that Minnesota proposed allowing people to play the state lottery through video
game systems from home.38 Moreover, this new system of gambling would
force children to associate gambling with things that children love, such as
videogames.39 Congress also cited statistics, stating that of the approximately 8

Id.
Id. at 4.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Id. at 5.
33
Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy
Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992).
34
See S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 5 (1991).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. (citing Eben Shapiro, Nintendo ad Minnesota Set a Living-Room Lottery
29
30
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million problem gamblers in America in 1991, 1 million of them were under
the age of 20.40
However, PASPA was not without its critics during the legislative hearing
process. The Department of Justice (hereinafter, “DOJ”) was one of the
strongest opponents against PASPA.41 The DOJ was concerned about PASPA’s
constitutionality because PASPA intruded into “determinations of how to raise
revenue,” an area typically left to the states.42 The DOJ was also concerned
with federalism issues,43 as PASPA’s language states:
A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced in an
appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the
United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports
organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such
44
violation.

This language specifically allows a sports league, such as the MLB or
NFL, to sue any state trying to enact a law that legalizes sports betting. The
DOJ found this provision of PASPA “particularly troubling [because it] would
permit enforcement. . .by sports leagues.”45 This section of PASPA reveals
potential constitutional issues of standing.46
Another opponent of Bill 474 was Senator Chuck Grassley.47 Senator
Grassley raised many of the same arguments that the DOJ did;48 however,
Senator Grassley also made a significant public policy argument concerning
one of the major criticisms of PASPA.49 The Senator argued that while “sports
gambling is a national problem and. . .the moral erosion it produces cannot be
limited geographically,” this reasoning can be applied to “any form of wagering
many other state revenue raising programs”; and Congress should not tell the
states how to raise revenue.50 The Senator makes a fair point, correctly
observing that since PASPA allows grandfather exemptions for states where
gambling was already authorized by a state statute, PASPA does not actually

Test, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/27/
business/nintendo-and-minnesota-set-a-living-room-lotterytest.html?pagewanted=all).
40
S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 5 (1991). The legislative history did not cite the source
of these statistics. See id.
41
James C. W. Goodall, Note, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of the
Law and Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
of 1992, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2015).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2016) (emphasis added).
45
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (1991).
46
See infra Part II.A (addressing more issues raised by challengers to PASPA).
47
Goodall, supra note 41, at 1108–09.
48
Id. at 1109.
49
Goodall, supra note 41, at 1109; S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12.
50
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991).
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prohibit the evils of sports gambling, but rather restricts the evils to small
geographical areas of the country.51 Senator Grassley was also concerned that
these grandfather exemptions would result in discrimination between the states,
giving favorable treatment to states such as Nevada while prohibiting other
states from engaging in the same conduct, and that these distinctions were
irrationally assigned.52 Furthermore, PASPA could establish precedent for the
Federal Government to prohibit any state revenue program with Congress’
Commerce Clause power.53
Despite the DOJ’s opposition coupled with Senator Grassley’s and other
legislators’ concerns, Congress still decided PASPA was necessary.54 Because
of the recent baseball betting scandal by Pete Rose, as well as previous scandals
within professional and amateur sports relating to sports betting,55 members in
Congress felt that the harm caused by legalizing nationwide sports betting—the
purpose behind passing the Bill—outweighed the financial benefits that the
states sought from legalization.56 Therefore, on October 28, 1992, President
George H. W. Bush signed PASPA into law.57
B. PASPA has Failed to Accomplish the Purposes Behind its Enactment
To review, the legislative history shows that there were three primary
purposes behind PASPA’s enactment. Those three purposes are to stop the
spread of sports gambling, to maintain the integrity of sports, and to reduce the
likelihood of America’s youth gambling.58 Many critics have argued that
PASPA has not actually achieved these three goals, despite being in existence
for almost twenty-five years now.59
28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2016); S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13 (claiming Delaware should not be included as a
grandfathered state because it was not “conducting any form of sports wagering and
[had] not done so for the last fifteen (15) years”).
53
Id. at 12.
54
See generally id.; 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2016).
55
See Pete Rose, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM, supra note 25; See generally Douglas
Linder, The Black Sox Trial: An Account, FAMOUS TRIALS (2010),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/blacksox/
blacksoxaccount.html
(indicating that while Pete Rose’s ban from baseball regarding sports betting was
likely the most significant scandal underlying PASPA’s enactment, it was not the
first time players had affected baseball’s reputation due to involvement in sports
wagering; the most famous example is the Chicago “Black Sox” scandal which
involved eight players on the 1919 Chicago White Sox accepting bribes from sports
bettors to lose the World Series on purpose).
56
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991).
57
W. Dane Carey, Comment, Two Lessons of Anticommandeering: The
Preemptive Significance of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 11
WILLIAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2013).
58
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5.
59
Meer, supra note 4, at 293–98; Goodall, supra note 41, at 1133–35; see Is
Legalizing Sports Gambling a Mad Idea?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 21, 2015, 6:48
51
52
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1. Since the Enactment of PASPA, Sports Betting Popularity Has
Increased, Including Illegal Sports Betting
Regarding the spread of sports gambling, it seems that sports gambling has
only grown in popularity since PASPA’s enactment in 1992. Despite Nevada
having a monopoly as the only state authorized to participate in wholesale legal
sports betting, nationwide newspapers now present gambling advice and betting
lines.60 Americans bet billions of dollars during March Madness, the term
commonly used to refer to the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament.61
Moreover, while most people know this tournament is one of the biggest draws
for sports betting,62 President Obama has put out his “picks” for which team he
believes will win each game for the past several years.63 While the President is
not explicitly promoting sports betting, it has been estimated that more people
fill out brackets than vote in an election; as the President and CEO of the
American Gaming Association stated, “[I]t’s clear that Americans embrace
gaming.”64 Since 1991, there has been evidence of an increase in sports betting,
rather than the decrease PASPA desired: bets on the Super Bowl in Nevada
alone have increased by nearly $80 million dollars.65
Further, illegal sports betting is now prevalent in the United States;
according to CNBC, people illegally bet between $60–70 billion annually on
college football.66 The FBI approximates that over $2.5 billion dollars is
PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/amid-madness-college-basketball-bracketspush-legalize-sports-betting/.
60
Woo, supra note 14, 589 (indicating that many of the major newspapers in the
country, such as USA Today and the New York Post offer betting lines in the sports
section of the newspapers).
61
Jonathan Marino, Americans Will Drop $9 Billion Betting on March Madness,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
ncaa-tournament-gambling-projection-2015-3.
62
Id.
63
President Obama: Cats Wear Crown, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/mens-collegebasketball/tournament/2015/story/_/id/12505909/president-barack-obama-bracketpicks-kentucky-ncaa-men-basketball-title; President Obama Picks Spartans, ESPN
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/2014/
story/_/id/10630406/louisville-michigan-st-arizona-florida-president-barackobama-final-four.
64
David Purdum, Estimated 40 Million Fill out Brackets, ESPN (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/12465741/estimated-70-million-brackets-9million-bets-ncaa-tournament.
65
Jack Jones, Amount Bet on the Super Bowl, BETFIRM.COM (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150502070522/http://www.betfirm.com/amountbet-on-the-super-bowl/.
66
Gillian Spear, Think Sports Gambling Isn’t Big Money? Wanna Bet?, NBC
NEWS (July 15, 2013, 4:16 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/thinksports-gambling-isnt-big-money-wanna-bet-f6C10634316.
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wagered illegally during March Madness, while legal sports books in Nevada
only bring in between $80–90 million during those same three weeks.67 In other
words, legal sports betting during March Madness takes in less than 4% of the
illegal take.68 Because sports betting, especially illegal sports betting, is so
popular in America today, it seems PASPA has fallen short in accomplishing
the first of three purposes behind its enactment.
2. PASPA Has Little to No Effect on Cutting Down Incidents Affecting the
Integrity of Sports
Since PASPA’s enactment in 1992, there have been multiple incidents
involving not only collegiate sports betting scandals, but also professional
sports betting scandals, both of which reveal that PASPA is not living up to
another one of its intended purposes.
Regarding collegiate sports betting scandals after PASPA’s enactment, 19
athletes from the University of Maine’s basketball and football teams received
suspensions in 1992 for participating in a gambling operation that raked in
$3,000 to $10,000 per week.69 In 1995, a jury convicted a former student at the
University of Central Florida of attempting to bribe basketball players at the
college to ensure that the team would lose by enough points to cover the betting
spread.70 The student offered $15,000 in bribes;71 however, the University of
Central Florida players insisted that they never actually took the money and
that they did not alter their play based on any bribe.72
One of the most glaring stains on the integrity of collegiate sporting events
occurred in 1994, two years after PASPA’s enactment, in the Arizona State
point-shaving scandal.73 The scandal involved two basketball players at
Arizona State conspiring to shave points,74 if needed, in order to win a bet they
placed on their own game against Oregon State.75 This scandal was especially
heinous because it was unlike the other collegiate sports betting scandals
Id.
Id.
69
COLLEGES; Maine Hit by Gambling Scandal h, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/
1992/04/19/sports/colleges-maine-hit-by-gamblingscandal-h.html.
70
Warren Richey, Man Who Tried To Fix College Game Avoids Jail, SUN
SENTINEL
(Nov.
4,
1995),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-1104/news/9511040043_1_kelly-hunter-game-prosecutors.
71
Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Throwing the Game, TIME (Sept. 17,
2000), http://content.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,55103,00.html.
72
Richey, supra note 70.
73
Point-Shaving Scandal Hits Arizona State, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1997),
http://articles.latimes.com/ 1997/dec/06/sports/sp-61336.
74
Shaving points is the act of a team or player deliberately missing an opportunity
to score in order to make sure that the spread of a game is not covered and therefore
controlling the outcome of a placed bet. See Id.
75
Id.
67
68
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already mentioned in this article; most other betting scandals involved players
betting on games that were not their own or rejecting bribes from third parties.
The two players involved admitted to fixing four games in 1994, and they
admitted to taking bribes to fix these four games.76
Another collegiate sports gambling scandal that negatively affected the
integrity of sports was the indictment of two former Northwestern basketball
players who took money to fix games and shave points in 1994–1995.77 A jury
would later convict those two Northwestern basketball players of rigging the
games.78 Northwestern was later involved in another gambling scandal when
four football players plead guilty to perjury after previously denying any
involvement in fixing football games when prosecutors had questioned them.79
Countless other collegiate sports betting scandals have occurred since PASPA
was passed, including the most recent scandal when a Boston University
hockey player received suspension in 2015 for participating in gambling
activities.80
Moreover, PASPA has failed to uphold public confidence in the integrity
of sporting events in the professional setting as well. Professional tennis has
seen many scandals involving match fixing, including a 2007 match involving
Nikolay Davydenko and Martin Vassallo Arguello.81 In a relatively minor
tennis match between these two, bettors wagered more than $7 million in favor
of Arguello, an extreme underdog unlikely to win.82 That $7 million was more
than ten times the amount usually wagered on similar low-profile matches.83 It
was so unusual that the largest Internet wagering company, Betfair, actually
removed the match from bettors and voided all bets placed on the match.84 This
was a first for Betfair, a company that had been accepting wagers for seven
years.85 And professional match fixing still occurs: another professional tennis
scandal surfaced as recently as 2015 when two players, Walter Trusendi and
Elie Rousset, admitted they fixed matches in 2014.86

Id.
Pam Belluck, COLLEGE BASKETBALL; Ex-Northwestern Players Charged in
Point-Shaving, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/27/
sports/college-basketball-ex-northwestern-players-charged-in-point-shaving.html.
78
Barlett & Steele, supra note 71.
79
Id.
80
Mike McMahon & Adam Wodon, BU’s Roberto Suspended for Gambling
Activity, COLLEGE HOCKEY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.collegehockeynews.
com/news/2015/12/21_bus_roberto_suspended_for.php.
81
Greg Garber, Suspicions Follow Davydenko Heading to U.S. Open, ESPN (Aug.
23, 2007, 4:52 PM), http://espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=2984805.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Regina Avalos, Tennis Player Match Fixing Scandal: Players Banned for Six
Months, INQUISITR (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/1954354/tennis76
77
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Tennis is not the only professional sport that has experienced illegal betting
since PASPA. The NBA’s integrity came into question in 2007 when NBA
referee Tim Donaghy plead guilty to betting on NBA games he officiated.87
Not only did he bet on games himself, but he also was involved in an ongoing
gambling ring involving other organized crime members.88 Donaghy would
feed inside information to his co-conspirators regarding the teams and
players.89 Those organized crime members initially paid Donaghy $2,000 for
every game in which Donaghy correctly picked the winner, and eventually paid
him $5,000 per game due to his accuracy.90 This scandal led thencommissioner David Stern, an early proponent of PASPA, to take a step back
and state in a 2009 interview that legalized gambling may not be as bad as
previously suggested.91 Stern further stated that gambling might not be as
immoral as previously anticipated.92
Incidents of match fixing and illegal gambling at both collegiate and
professional level sports show that the bottom line is this: the public will
always question the integrity of sporting events. Donaghy, Davydenko, or any
of the college players mentioned above would likely have participated in these
incidents regardless of whether sports betting was legal. In other words, the fact
that sports betting was illegal did not stop them from violating the integrity of a
game, showing that PASPA has fallen short of reaching one of its main
objectives. Further, the integrity of a game is not only affected by sports
betting; other issues, such as athletes taking performance enhancing drugs,
seem to threaten games more and more each day.93 Therefore, PASPA seems
ineffective in achieving its second objective to maintain the integrity of
sporting events and likely will be short-lived in the future.
3. PASPA Has Failed to Control the Promotion of Sports Gambling Among
the Youth of America
The final and most noble reason behind ratifying PASPA was to decrease
the likelihood of youth gambling in America.94 Since 1992, however, youth
gambling has increased, showing that PASPA has failed at yet another purpose
behind its enactment. First, it is impossible for PASPA to completely to stop
youth sports gambling because there are many avenues for young people to use

player-match-fixing-scandal-players-banned-for-six-months/.
87
Ex-NBA Ref Pleads Guilty in Betting Scandal, CNN (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/ US/law/08/15/nba.ref/index.html?iref=topnews.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Meer, supra note 4, at 296–97.
92
Id. at 297.
93
Id.
94
See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5.
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in order to gamble on sports illegally.95 Since 1992, Internet use has exploded
within the American population, with children between the ages of 8 and 18
logging seven hours online each day.96 While PASPA proponents could not
have predicted the future in 1992, it is clear that the new avenues available to
minors allow them unprecedented and typically unfettered access to multiple
illegal activities, including sports betting.
Further, while statistics regarding youth gambling are scarce, the few
studies done surrounding American youth gambling show an increase in
gambling since 1992, rather than the decrease that PASPA longingly sought.97
In fact, “regional surveys suggest that more than 30% of all high school
students gamble periodically.”98 Current gambling among America’s youth has
escalated to the point that some middle schools are now starting to have their
own illegal betting rings.99 Further, the expansion of new technology, such as
the Internet and lottery ticket vending machines, only contribute to increased
adolescent gambling.100
While current gambling rates among America’s youth may be informative,
only by observing a comparison of post- and pre-PASPA gambling rates can
PASPA’s failure be truly appreciated. One study published by the National
Center for Responsible Gaming shows that from 1992 to 1998, the percentage
of 9th grade boys who frequently gambled increased from 21.8% to 22.9%.101
While this increase may not seem that drastic, frequent gambling among 12th
grade boys from 1992 to 1998 went up from 23.8% to 29%.102 Moreover, the
same study summarizes the answer to the question “are youths gambling more,
less, or about the same?” by proving that from 1992–1995 gambling stayed at a
constant level with a slight increase in gambling habits among certain
youths.103 Remember: PASPA’s goal was to decrease the likelihood of
America’s youth gambling, not keep it at a consistent level.
A pamphlet from California is also ripe with evidence that gambling has

Meer, supra note 4, at 297–98.
Id. (citing Tamar Lewin, If Your Kids Are Awake, They’re Probably Online,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at A1).
97
Francie Grace, Kids Gambling – and Losing, CBS NEWS (July 14, 2003, 5:58
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/kids-gambling-and-losing/;
Randy
Stinchfield, Gender, Age Are Most Important Clues for Teen Gambling Behavior, 1
INCREASING THE ODDS, at 4 (2009), http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/
files/uploads/docs/monographs/ncrgmonographyouthforwebfinal.pdf.
98
Grace, supra note 97.
99
Id.
100
See id.
101
Stinchfield, supra note 97.
102
Id.
103
Randy Stinchfield & Ken C. Winters, Gambling and Problem Gambling Among
Youths, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172, 178 (Mar. 1998),
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/stable/
1049337?loginSuccess=true&seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents.
95
96
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increased among America’s youth.104 A study found that a majority of
adolescents across the United States reported gambling before they graduated
high school.105 The study cited also found that “gambling participation among
middle and high school students from 1984–1988 was 45% and increased to
65% from 1989–2002.”106 Further, the “most popular forms of gambling among
young people are private bets” regarding sports.107 Lastly, sports betting is one
of the most attractive forms of gambling to young people because those bets
involve skills with which adolescents can relate.108
While the introduction of the internet has made it much easier for
adolescents to gamble on sports, this should not excuse PASPA for failing to
achieve its third and most important objective. Typically, a change in
circumstances or factual assumptions is one factor courts determine when
analyzing whether or not to apply the principal of stare decisis109; therefore, as
new technology has rendered PASPA’s purpose of lowering youth gambling
rates unworkable, PASPA should be lumped in with the rest of the bad
precedents and overturned.110
II. HISTORY OF NCAA V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY AND WHY IT IS SO
IMPORTANT TO NEW JERSEY TO LEGALIZE SPORTS GAMBLING NATIONWIDE
Over the past three years, New Jersey has become more and more adamant
about nationwide legalization of sports betting.111 Why the sudden push? This
new battle between PASPA and New Jersey is primarily due to New Jersey’s
hurting economy, especially in Atlantic City, the gaming capital of New
Jersey.112 New Jersey is quite aware of the potential market for sports
gambling, considering that many Americans currently engage in the pastime
illegally and that states are missing out on billions of potentially taxable

See Gianna Le et. al., Youth Gambling in the 21st Century: Prevalence, Impact,
and Interventions, NAPAFASA PROBLEM GAMBLING PREVENTION TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROJECT, http://www.napafasa.org/resources/
PGP.Youth%20Gambling%20in%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf (last visited Sept.
5, 2016).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. In addition, as youth gamblers grow older, they prefer less “skill based”
games and more games of chance, such as lotteries and slot machines. Id.
109
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
110
The statistics show that PASPA’s lack of intended effect previously cited only
furthers the argument behind PASPA’s repeal. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–5; see
Gianna Le et. al supra note 104.
111
See Joe Drape, New Jersey’s Effort to Legalize Sports Betting Is Denied on
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/sports/
football/new-jerseys-effort-to-legalize-sports-betting-is-denied-onappeal.html?_r=0.
112
Id.
104
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dollars.113 This note discusses the major reasons behind the economic recession
within New Jersey later in this section.114
Ironically, the opponent that continuously lobbies to stop legalized
gambling is the professional and collegiate sporting organizations, such as the
NFL and the NCAA.115 The irony is that these same opponents of New Jersey
have embraced daily fantasy sports (hereinafter, “DFS”) as legal by labeling it
a game of skill, rather than a game of chance, which is one of the defining
elements of gambling.116 Moreover, these professional sporting organizations
have sponsored DFS, and logos of DFS giants such as FanDuel or DraftKings
are visible at many live sporting events.117 It is hard to see how these
professional sporting organizations can claim that legalized sports betting will
“‘irreparably’ corrupt sports in the United States”118 while embracing DFS,
especially considering the new state trend to rule that DFS is illegal
gambling.119 Many NFL teams are also starting to install “fantasy lounges,”
which typically look like sports books within a Nevada casino.120 The irony
also provides critics of PASPA with more ammunition, showing that the
professional sports organizations that were the original opponents against
sports gambling, and are New Jersey’s current opponent in NCAA v. Governor
of New Jersey, now embrace an activity that many states are deeming illegal
sports gambling.121

See id. (stating Americans illegally bet at least $140 billion on sports per year).
See Infra Part II.B.
115
Drape, supra note 111.
116
David Purdum & Darren Rovell, N.Y. AG Declares DraftKings, FanDuel Are
Illegal Gambling, Not Fantasy, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk/
story/_/id/14100780/new-york-attorney-general-declares-daily-fantasy-sportsgambling; Drape, supra note 111.
117
Purdum & Rovell, supra note 116 (The NBA has invested heavily in FanDuel,
while the MLB and NHL have invested heavily in DraftKings); see also Drape,
supra note 111 (examining the logos around the ice rink while watching hockey
and, typically, noticing a DraftKings logo will be within view).
118
Drape, supra note 111.
119
Many states declared DFS illegal gambling at the time this article was written,
including New York, Illinois, Nevada, Arizona, Iowa, and others. See Purdum &
Rovell, supra note 116; see also Jacob Pramuk, Illinois: Daily Fantasy Sports is
Illegal Gambling, CNBC (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/23/
illinois-daily-fantasy-sports-is-illegal-gambling.html; What Are The States Where
You
Can
Play
Daily
Fantasy
Sports?,
LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasy-sports-blocked-allowed-states/ (last
updated Aug. 9, 2016).
120
Drape, supra note 111.
121
Dustin Gouker, The New Daily Fantasy Sports Bill in New York Brings Up
PASPA
Concerns,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REP.
(Dec.
4,
2015),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/6650/ny-dfs-bill-and-paspa/; see supra Part I(B).
113
114
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A. New Jersey’s Four-Year Courtroom Battle Against Professional Sports
Organizations
On November 28, 2011, Assemblyman John Burzichelli122 introduced a
bill to the New Jersey Legislature that defined and established operating
procedures for any casino that wished to have a “sports pool” within their
premises.123 The bill is effective as law on January 17, 2012.124 The New Jersey
Legislature also amended the New Jersey Constitution on December 8, 2011 to
allow for sports betting at New Jersey casinos, so long as the sporting event did
not involve a New Jersey college team and did not occur at a New Jersey
venue.125 Soon afterwards, the five major professional sports organizations126
filed a complaint against New Jersey, alleging that PASPA preempted New
Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law, and therefore the New Jersey law was
unconstitutional.127 New Jersey then filed a motion for summary judgment
stating that the professional sports organizations did not have standing to bring
this suit.128
The New Jersey district court held that the professional sports
organizations did have standing to bring this injunction.129 The court stated that
because the New Jersey law would cause “fans’ perception of the integrity of
[the] games [to] decline,” this was enough to create an imminent and personal
harm to the sports organizations.130 Further, the court stated that precedent has
held that perceived harm is enough to find standing so long as the “harm is
based in reality.”131 The sports organizations also had three empirical studies
that did not directly show causation but implied the negative impact of
legalized sports gambling effects on revenue generation for sports leagues.132
The court also held that the perceived sports organizations’ injury of lower
match-integrity combined with the empirical studies would be traceable back to
Assemb. B. 4385, 2010 Leg., 214th sess. (N.J. 2012).
N.J. REV. STAT. §5:12A-1 (2011) (repealed 2014).
124
Id.
125
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (stating “It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to
authorize by law wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City on the
results of any professional, college, or amateur sport or athletic event, except that
wagering shall not be permitted on a college sport or athletic event that takes place
in New Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which any New Jersey college team
participates regardless of where the event takes place”).
126
NCAA, NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB are the five major sports organizations
referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “the Leagues” throughout the 2012 case, NCAA v.
Christie. NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183395 (D.N.J.
Dec. 21, 2012).
127
Id. at *5.
128
Id. at *4–5.
129
Id. at *8.
130
Id. at *4, *9–20.
131
Id. at *14.
132
Id. at *15–18.
122
123
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the implementation New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.133 Lastly, the court
held that stopping the implementation of New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law
would redress the alleged harms because even a small reduction in harm is
enough to establish redressability.134
Two months after deciding the question of standing, the court heard
arguments regarding the constitutionality of PASPA raised by New Jersey.135
New Jersey argued that PASPA violated the commerce clause, the Tenth
Amendment, the due process and equal protection principals of the Fifth
Amendment, and the equal footing doctrine.136 The professional sports
organizations argued that PASPA is constitutional, and thus the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution preempts New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.137
The court started its analysis by asserting that “congressional statutes are
presumptively constitutional,” and that PASPA must be given “every
reasonable construction” to save it from unconstitutionality; this turned out to
be too high a burden for New Jersey to overcome.138
In regards to New Jersey’s commerce clause argument, the district court
held that Congress did not violate the commerce clause when it passed PASPA
in 1992.139 The court cited Hodel v. Indiana140 to show the deferential rational
basis standard was applied to analyze whether the law was under the commerce
power of Congress.141 The court found Congress’ cessation of legalized sports
gambling rationally related to the purpose of protecting the integrity of sports,
as other states would be impacted by interstate-legalized sports betting.142 New
Jersey also argued that the grandfather clause of PASPA violated the commerce
clause by citing Delaware River Basin Commission v. Bucks County Water &
Sewer Authority, a case that held a grandfather clause requires higher scrutiny
than rational basis.143 However, the court dismissed this argument because,
unlike the enactment of the statute in Delaware River Basin Commission, there
were legislative findings behind PASPA’s enactment.144 Given the legislative
history of PASPA, and given that New Jersey conceded Congress had the
authority to regulate gambling, the district court’s holding was inevitable.145
The court further held that New Jersey’s argument regarding the Tenth

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at *25–26.
Id. at *26.
Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d 551.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 554, 557.
See id. at 558–60.
452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981).
Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
Id. at 559–60.
Id. at 561 (citing 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 558–59.

WYANT FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

NCAA V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY

5/30/17 2:23 PM

239

Amendment held no water, as PASPA did not command or require New Jersey
to take any affirmative action at the request of the federal government.146 New
Jersey argued that the Tenth Amendment’s language reserves to the states those
powers not explicitly granted to the federal government in the Constitution.147
New Jersey also argued that PASPA’s effect on the state was analogous to the
take-title provision in New York v. United States.148 The court explained that
historically the states gave up powers in order to establish a unitary federal
government, and that New Jersey’s rigid idea of the Tenth Amendment was the
type of government under the old Articles of Confederation, not the new
Constitution.149 After discussing the history leading up to New York, the court
announced the holding that while federal statutes could not compel the states to
act, federal statutes could direct or motivate the states to act in a certain
fashion.150 The court relied heavily on the fact that “compel” is defined as
forcing states to take affirmative action, and here PASPA is not forcing any
affirmative action but rather preventing states from taking certain action.151
Furthermore, the court bolstered its argument by restating that the effects of
just one state legalizing sports gambling extend outside that state and are not
purely affecting intrastate activities; therefore, Congress has regulatory power
to ensure that one state’s actions do not affect other states negatively.152
Looking to the Fifth Amendment, and its Due Process Clause and implied
Equal Protection principles,153 the court held that New Jersey is not a “person”
and therefore the Due Process Clause does not protect it.154 However, the court
still performed a Due Process/Equal Protection analysis, and found that PASPA
did not involve any fundamental rights nor did it make classifications against
protected classes of people; therefore, it was presumably valid, subject to the
deferential rational basis review.155 Again, applying the rational basis review
standard, the court held that PASPA was rationally related to Congress’
legitimate purpose of protecting the integrity of sporting events and preventing

Id. at 561–63.
Id. at 561–62.
148
Id.; 505 U.S. 144, 173–77 (1992).
149
Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (noting ironically that one of the two
plans considered at the Constitutional Convention was called the “New Jersey
Plan” and is the plan that would have supported New Jersey’s idea about the tenth
amendment).
150
Id. at 566–67.
151
Id. at 570.
152
Id. at 572.
153
The Fifth Amendment has no Equal Protection Clause per se; however, through
reverse incorporation the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been read into the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–
99 (1954).
154
Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
155
Id. at 574–75.
146
147
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the spread of sports gambling.156
New Jersey’s “Equal Footing” argument also failed as the court stated that
New Jersey was not “either attempting to enter the Union or one that [was]
recently admitted to the Union.”157 After determining that PASPA is
constitutional, the Court granted a permanent injunction for the professional
sports organizations against New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.158 New Jersey
appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling regarding
standing, constitutional issues, and the granting of an injunction, stating that
Congress, not the courts, must be the one to alter PASPA’s effect on the
states.159 New Jersey attempted to appeal to the United States Supreme Court in
2014 but the Court did not grant writ of certiorari to hear the case.160
However, New Jersey would not stop there, doubtless determined to bring
a new source of revenue to their downtrodden economy. New Jersey partially
repealed its Sports Wagering Law on October 17, 2014, which was the subject
of the 2012 litigation, by removing state prohibitions, permits, and licensing
requirements with the help of the severability clause contained within the 2012
law.161 By repealing these state requirements, the 2014 law essentially allowed
only casinos and racetracks to offer sports wagering.162
New Jersey argued that they were simply complying with PASPA’s
language, that a state may not “authorize, sponsor, operate, advertise, promote,
or license sports betting.”163 Because the 2014 law repealed the licensing
requirements and removed sports betting from state supervision, New Jersey
argued that they are not attempting to circumvent PASPA.164 Further, New
Jersey argued that they are complying with the Third Circuit’s decision in the
prior case by citing court language that PASPA does not “prohibit New Jersey
from repealing its ban on sports wagering,” and that the states can decide “the
exact contours of the prohibition[s]” regarding sports wagering.165 However,

Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 577.
158
Id. at 577, 579.
159
Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2013).
160
Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S.Ct. 2866 (2014).
161
Bob Jordan & Steve Edelson, Gov. Christie Signs New Jersey Sports Betting
Bill into Law, USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/2014/10/17/chris-christie-signs-bill-allowing-sports-betting-newjersey/17457177/; see also N.J. REV. STAT. §5:12A-1 (2011) (repealed 2014).
162
Will Hobson, Everything You Need to Know About New Jersey’s Pending
High-Stakes Sports Gambling Ruling, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/
07/01/everything-youneed-to-know-about-new-jerseys-pending-high-stakes-sports-gambling-ruling/.
163
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Id. (pointing out the similarity between the court’s ruling about the legalization
of sports betting and other courts’ rulings, such as Colorado and Washington, about
the legalization of marijuana).
165
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie (Christie II Dist. Ct.), 61 F. Supp. 3d
156
157
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the five major professional sports organizations disagreed and argued that
permitting sports betting in state-licensed casinos and racetracks is state
licensing and state authorization,166 and therefore the sports organizations again
sought an injunction against New Jersey and the new 2014 law.167
This time, District Judge Shipp168 analyzed only New Jersey’s partial
repeal in the context of the Third Circuit’s previous ruling, rather than the
constitutionality of PASPA, which had already been decided.169 The court
examined the Third Circuit’s language, which ultimately described “two
choices” that PASPA provides to the states: either repeal the sports wagering
ban or keep a complete ban on sports wagering and enforce it as they see fit.170
After another preemption analysis, federal legislative history review, and state
legislative history review, the district court held that PASPA preempted the
2014 partial repeal law.171 The court sided with the sports organizations, stating
that anything beyond either a full repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering
would give states too much power to circumvent the federal government.172
The court further stated that the 2014 partial repeal had the same effect as the
2012 law previously struck down.173 The court again permanently enjoined
New Jersey from violating PASPA with its 2014 partial repeal.174
New Jersey again appealed the district court’s ruling to the Third Circuit
and the Third Circuit again upheld the lower court’s ruling because the 2014
partial repeal essentially authorized sports wagering.175 The Third Circuit
acknowledged that PASPA was not without its critics and that New Jersey
faced economic hardships, but the court echoed that states cannot undo federal
laws whenever they see fit.176
However, good news exists for New Jersey, as the Third Circuit has
recently vacated its decision regarding the 2014 partial repeal and granted a
rehearing en banc.177 This is a rare occurrence because a majority of the active
judges who signed the order must have voted to rehear the case; this shows the
need to readdress some of the major issues behind the litigation.178 The Third
488, 495 (2014).
166
Hobson, supra note 162.
167
Christie II Dist. Ct., 61 F. Supp. 3d 488.
168
Judge Shipp was the Judge on the original Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Christie suit as well. See Christie I Dist. Ct., 926 F. Supp. 2d 551.
169
Christie II Dist. Ct., 61 F. Supp. 3d at 498.
170
Id. at 500.
171
Id. at 503–06.
172
Id. at 504.
173
Id. at 505.
174
Id. at 507–08.
175
Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2015) (decision vacated 2015).
176
Id. at 265 (citing to Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013)).
177
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839, *7–8
(3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015).
178
Drape, supra note 17.
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Circuit Court of Appeals reheard the case on February 17, 2016.179
B. Why is New Jersey So Adamant on Legalizing Sports Wagering Nationally?
Since the nationwide economic recession in the late 2000s, New Jersey is
one of the few states that has increasing poverty rates, unlike many other
states.180 While the United States as a whole has recovered 132% of jobs lost
during the recession, New Jersey’s economy has only recovered 62% of jobs
lost.181 New Jersey’s job growth rate was also the lowest in the contiguous
United States from 2013–2014.182 Further, New Jersey’s economic growth in
2014 ranked 46 out of all 50 states, with an unemployment rate well above the
national average.183 The downtrodden economy is also uncommon to the
regional Northeast, as neighboring states, such as New York and Pennsylvania,
have bounced back since the recession.184
New Jersey’s Atlantic City gaming industry was hit exceptionally hard
since the recession and continues to flounder economically.185 This is bad news
for Atlantic City, whose economy brings in two-thirds of its revenue through
gambling and only one-third from non-gambling revenue sources.186 Further,
since 2006, gaming revenue has dropped from $5.2 billion to $2.7 billion.187 In
fact, in 2014, six years after the recession, four casinos had closed and over
8,000 workers lost their jobs in the gaming industry.188 The four casinos to
close were the Atlantic Club, the Showboat, the Revel (which was supposed to
bring back Atlantic City’s gaming industry), and the Trump Plaza.189 Those
four closures caused Atlantic City’s tax base to drop more than $13 billion in
property taxes; in 2013, before the closures, all the casinos in Atlantic City
Darren Heitner, Is Sports Betting About to Become Legal Outside of Nevada?,
FORBES (Feb. 15, 2016, 11:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/
2016/02/15/is-sports-betting-about-to-become-legal-outside-ofnevada/#44bb49ad5c02.
180
Heather Long, Chris Christie’s Problem: New Jersey’s Economy isn’t Doing
Well, CNN (June 30, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/30/
news/economy/chris-christie-2016-new-jersey-economy/.
181
Id.
182
Michael L. Diamond, Part 1: What Comeback? Why N.J.’s Economy Has
Tanked, COURIER-POST (Oct. 21, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.courierpostonline.
com/story/news/local/new-jersey/2014/10/20/comeback-njs-economytanked/17602283/.
183
Long, supra note 180.
184
Id.
185
See Diamond, supra note 182 (stating that New Jersey’s gaming industry has
collapsed since 2008).
186
Nick Paumgarten, The Death and Life of Atlantic City, THE NEW YORKER
(Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/09/07/the-death-andlife-of-atlantic-city.
187
Id.
188
Diamond, supra note 182.
189
Paumgarten, supra note 186.
179
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provided 70% of annual property taxes within the city.190 One of the major
reasons behind Atlantic City’s decline has been the loss of the city’s monopoly
on legalized gambling in the East Coast region.191
With gambling available in other neighboring states such as New York,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the gaming industry in Atlantic City has been
“cannibalized” by these new casinos.192 The first casino in Atlantic City opened
in 1978; however, in 1996 Delaware provided some competition by opening
three slot venues.193 Pennsylvania then opened its first casino in 2006 and
added more casinos yearly.194 In fact, by 2011, thirteen casinos had opened up
in Pennsylvania and Delaware, with three more proposed to open; moreover,
these numbers do not include the casinos that opened in either Maryland or
New York.195 By adding table games in 2010, both Delaware and Pennsylvania
had destroyed New Jersey’s monopoly.196
Studies also show that the introduction of these table games and casinos in
New Jersey’s neighboring states has had a positive economic impact within
those states while eroding Atlantic City’s casino industry.197 Further,
“[a]pproximately $1,262 less is gambled every month in Delaware, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania with the addition of each Pennsylvania slot machine,”
showing a negative effect of adjacent state casinos.198 This is likely because
Atlantic City no longer has a gambling monopoly in the Northeast, causing
many people from neighboring states to now play locally rather than travel out
of state to gamble.199 A 2005 study supports this point, finding that nearly 64%
of people visiting New Jersey casinos were residents of a different state.200
Further, even more casinos are expected to open within the next few years
in Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, further saturating
the gambling market and taking more money away from New Jersey.201 Some

Martin Bricketto, Atlantic City Bankruptcy Would Hurt Other Towns, Mayor
Says, LAW360 (May 15, 2015, 5:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/656664/
atlantic-city-bankruptcy-would-hurt-other-towns-mayor-says.
191
See Paumgarten, supra note 186.
192
Simon Condliffe, Pennsylvania Casinos’ Cannibalization of Regional
Gambling Revenues, 16 UNLV GAMING RES. & REV. J. 45, 45–50 (2012).
193
Id. at 45.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 48 (see figure 1).
196
Id. at 47.
197
Id. at 48–49. This erosion likely caused the close of the four Atlantic City
casinos mentioned earlier, which contributed to the loss of almost ten-thousand
jobs. Paumgarten, supra note 186.
198
Condliffe, supra note 192, at 54.
199
See id. at 53–54.
200
Id. at 49.
201
Peter Amsel, Regional Casino Saturation to Put Added Pressure on Atlantic
City in Coming Years, CALVINAYRE.COM (Dec. 1, 2015), http://calvinayre.com/
2015/12/01/casino/regional-casino-saturation-threatens-atlantic-city/.
190

WYANT FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/30/17 2:23 PM

244

[Vol. 7:223

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

predict these new casinos may cause the closure of more Atlantic City casinos,
which would likely increase New Jersey’s unemployment rate even more.202
However, if New Jersey were able to legalize sports betting, it is possible that
this change would result in an increase of new jobs as well as potentially help
the already downtrodden economy with another revenue source.203 Legalizing
sports betting would help take some of the $3.8 billion dollars bet illegally on
the Super Bowl, for example, and turn it into taxable revenue for states such as
New Jersey,204 but how would this affect Las Vegas’ monopoly on sports
betting?
III. NEVADA WILL LIKELY FEEL NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EFFECTS FROM
LEGALIZED SPORTS GAMBLING IN NEIGHBORING STATES
It is common sense that anytime a business loses a monopoly in an
industry, the increase in competition hurts that business’s bottom line.205 A
monopoly realizes a super-normal profit during its monopoly status; however,
the monopoly owner feels more competition as more players enter the market
because the monopoly owner can no longer set the prices as she sees fit due to
the new players offering the same product at lower prices.206 Therefore, the
once-monopoly owner must lower prices in order to compete with the new
competition prices or else lose large amounts of business to the rival
companies.207
Let us look at the only other real player in the sports betting market besides
Nevada—Delaware; unlike Nevada, which allows betting on any sporting event
in any fashion, Delaware runs a “sports lottery,” which allows players to place
parlay wagers on professional football games only.208 The parlay bets in
Delaware require gamblers to bet on the outcome of at least three games and
require them to guess all three outcomes correctly in order to win.209 As of

See id.
Stephen F. Ross et al., Reform of Sports Gambling in the United States: Lessons
from Down Under, 5 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 7, 15 (2015).
204
See Jonathan Crowl, Politicians, Experts Emphasize Multiple Benefits of
Legalized
Sports
Gambling,
THEPOSTGAME
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/spread-sheet/201502/politicians-experts-focusmultiple-benefits-legalized-sports-gambling.
205
Monopolies, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_
economics/Monopoly.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
206
See id.
207
See id.
208
Delaware Sports Lottery, DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, http://www.delottery.com/
games/sports/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
209
Jeff Barker, Delaware’s NFL Betting Business is Booming—and Marylanders
Are Noticing, THE BALT. SUN (Nov. 14, 2014, 11:56 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-sports-betting-nfl-20141114story.html.
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2016, 102 sports retailers accepted wagers on Delaware’s NFL parlay bets.210
The total of NFL parlay sales reached $37.9 million dollars in 2014–15, up
more than 300% since its inception in 2009–2010.211
Delaware’s increase every year in NFL parlay sales is likely due to the fact
it too has an unique monopoly on sports betting: it is the only place where
limited legal sports wagering exists east of the Mississippi river.212 This helps
Delaware compete in an already over-saturated market in the Northeast
concerning the large amounts of casinos in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland.213 In fact, although there is no exact count of how many people
travel to Delaware from neighboring states because of Delaware’s sports
betting, the influx of citizens from neighboring states has been “significant,”
especially to the Delaware sports lottery participants on the border of Maryland
and Pennsylvania.214 Given that Delaware has one of the smaller populations in
the United States at 935,614 people in 2014,215 it is even more likely that a
population base of that size, which includes all ages of persons, cannot produce
the entire $37.9 million in sales recorded in 2014.216
Delaware’s main limitation is that it only allows legal sports betting in the
form of NFL parlay bets, and an examination of Nevada, the only state to allow
all sports betting in any form, exhibits that limitation.217 Nevada’s 196 total
sports books received total bets in 2015 on all sports amounting to about $4.24
billion.218 This led to Nevada’s sports books profiting approximately $231.8
million for the 2015 year.219 This pure profit associated with sports wagering
only has nearly doubled since the year 2000.220 For an even closer analogy,
compare Nevada’s sports book profit from the NFL alone to Delaware’s profit
for 2015. Nevada sports books profited $82.5 million in 2015 from NFL
bets,221 while Delaware profited $13.9 million in 2015 from their NFL parlay

Craig Anderson, Delaware Sports Lottery Still Cashing in, DEL. ST. NEWS
(Feb. 6, 2016), http://delawarestatenews.net/news/delaware-sports-lottery-stillcashing-in/.
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Id.
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Barker, supra note 209.
213
See id.
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Id.
215
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/10,00 (last visited Sept. 9, 2016). In fact, Delaware only had the 45th
highest population out of all 50 states. States Ranked By Size & Population, IPL2,
http://www.ipl.org/div/stateknow/popchart.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
216
See Anderson, supra note 210.
217
See Delaware Sports Lottery, DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, supra note 208.
218
David G. Schwartz, Nevada Sports Betting Totals: 1984-2015, UNLV CTR. FOR
GAMING RES., 2 (Jan. 2016), http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/NV_sportsbetting.pdf.
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Id.
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Id. at 3.
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system.222 In 2015, while Delaware received approximately $7 million in
taxable revenue from sports wagering,223 Nevada sports wagering alone
generated approximately $18 million in taxes.224
While a comparison between the two states does not exactly produce
evidence that the two states are exactly alike, it can help identify some of the
similarities, which will lead to why Nevada likely will lose revenue if sports
betting becomes legalized across the country. First, while the population of
Nevada was 2,839,099 people in 2014,225 only slightly above 3 times the
population of Delaware, its sports books received more than 111 times the bets
than Delaware’s sports books.226 The next logical step is to think, “Well, so
what? Delaware is not the tourist destination that Nevada is.” This is quite true,
as Delaware pulled in 8 million visitors in 2014227 while Nevada attracted
approximately 7 times as many, receiving over 52 million visitors in 2014.228 It
also is important to note that both Delaware’s and Nevada’s per capita income
for 2014 are similar at $30,191 and $26,515, respectively.229
While, logically, not every one of those visitors came to Delaware or
Nevada to gamble, let alone bet on sports, some of these visitors likely did.
While scarce, some statistics exist as to who visits Nevada and the purposes
behind their visit. In 2009, estimates show that 35% of the visitors who came to
Las Vegas were from California.230 In fact, approximately 25.3 million people

Jonathan Starkey, Sports Betting Lucrative For Delaware, DELEWAREONLINE:
THE NEWS J. (Dec. 4, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/
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218.
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total bets placed in Nevada and dividing it by $37.9 million in bets placed in
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entered Nevada by vehicle in 2012, almost half of the near 51.6 million total
visitor volume for that year.231 This makes sense because when one looks at a
map of Nevada, Las Vegas and Reno are less than 100 miles from Arizona and
California, with Lake Tahoe touching the California border.232
Further, the American Gaming Association (AGA) states that legalized
sports wagering “helps bring in more than 30 million visitors to Nevada each
year.”233 While this estimate seems a little high, as it is more than 50% of the
tourists for the year of 2014, when examined in light of the fact that 35% of
tourists to Las Vegas come from California—which would approximate to
about 18.2 million in 2014—it seems a safe bet to estimate that at least 10
million visitors to Nevada annually are likely extremely interested in placing a
sports wager.234 Further, the AGA states that many tourists visit Nevada in
February and March to place bets legally on the Super Bowl and the NCAA
Men’s Basketball Tournament, respectively.235
Out of the total Nevada statewide non-restricted licensee gaming revenue,
4.11 billion was from table games and the sports book, while 7 billion came
from slot machines.236 Out of this 4.11 billion, sports betting pulled in the fifth
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233
Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING ASS’N., http://web.archive.org/web/
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highest revenue from any non-slot casino game statewide, making up 5.64% of
the total non-slot gaming revenue for casinos in Nevada.237 It consistently was
the fifth highest grossing non-slot game in Clark County comprising 5.3% of
all non-slot revenue.238 However, when considering both table games and slot
revenue, sports wagering only makes up 2.1% of total casino gaming
revenue.239
While 2.1% of total casino gaming revenue may seem insignificant,
remember that 2.1% still equals about $232 million, which will never be an
insignificant amount to a state obtaining about 25% of its taxes through gaming
revenue tax.240 The state’s ability to draw such a large percentage of taxes from
the gaming industry helps put less of a burden on its citizens, offering the third
best business tax climate in the country and ranking 49th out of 51 states (D.C.
included) in tax burdens on its residents.241 If sports betting were legalized
nationwide, this $232 million in taxable casino sports book revenue likely
would decrease, putting more of a tax burden on society and forcing the state to
look elsewhere for these funds.
Although the argument exists that Las Vegas itself is enough of a touristdraw to endure the potential losses in sports wagering, there are other towns
that rely on gaming revenue, such as Reno and Lake Tahoe.242 Lake Tahoe and
Reno both experienced gross gaming revenue declines from 1990–2010.243
These two cities experienced further gaming revenue decline of about 32% in
Lake Tahoe and 20% in Reno from 2008–2013.244 Lake Tahoe recently added a
new casino, the Hard Rock Hotel & Casino, to attempt to bolster its gaming
economy.245 However, the opening of a single tribal casino in California is a

See id. (The 5.64% figure was obtained by dividing the approximate 232
million that Sports Books pulled in during 2015 by the 4.11 billion in total non-slot
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revenue for 2014 at $2,851,648,150).
241
Id.
242
See William R. Eadington, Analyzing the Trends in Gaming-Based Tourism for
the State of Nevada: Implications for Public Policy and Economic Development, 15
UNLV GAMING RES. & REV. J. 37, 44–46 (2011).
243
Id.
244
Matthew Renda, A New Hand: With Gaming’s Decline, Tahoe’s Casino Resorts
Head in a New Direction, TAHOE Q. (Dec. 2014), http://tahoequarterly.com/
Features/Story/a-new-hand.
245
See Bill O’Driscoll, Tahoe Gaming ‘15: Good, Maybe Bad, Ahead, RENO
237

WYANT FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

NCAA V. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY

5/30/17 2:23 PM

249

primary reason for the major declines in these two Nevada gaming regions.246
The fact that opening a single tribal casino in California, not far from Lake
Tahoe and Reno, affected these regions this harshly shows how quickly the
gaming market can change in Nevada. One can also analogize this casinocannibalization phenomenon to sports wagering—Reno and Lake Tahoe lost
their monopoly when a tribal casino popped up nearby; if sports betting
becomes legal nationwide and California or Arizona implement sports
wagering, it is likely that Nevada will see a large decrease in sports wagering,
especially during big events like the SuperBowl or March Madness. This is
because people from neighboring states would no longer have to drive to either
Las Vegas or Reno, but rather could legally place these bets in their own
backyard.
Further, while Las Vegas consistently reinvents itself, it is seeing less and
less revenue generated from its slots than ever before because the millennial
generation does not prefer slot machine wagering.247 The average age of
visitors to Las Vegas has gotten younger since 2008.248 This is because the
Millennial Generation, also sometimes referred to as Gen Y, is 21–34 years old,
and is now one of the largest demographic groups in America.249 Millennials
are typically better educated than other generations, use their cell phones for
their main source of entertainment, and prefer to spend money on experiences
rather than gambling.250 Millennials enjoy games of skill, such as blackjack,
daily fantasy sports, and e-sports, more than slots.251 This has led casino
executives to try new skill-based slot machines resembling video games in an
attempt to attract this young group to become the biggest revenue producer in
the casino.252
Because sports wagering is a game of skill, and because the new generation
spends less on slot machines, sports wagering may become even more
important to casino revenue than it is today. If this is the case, Nevada may
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want to find a way to keep its monopoly in the sports wagering market because
if it loses this unique draw, it may lose one more option that Millennials come
to Nevada to enjoy. Further, the younger generation is even more into sports,
which is visible through their high interest in daily fantasy sports and e-sports,
making the sports wagering market an even more precious asset to Nevada.
While Las Vegas has always had the customer base and appeal to bring in
tourism, other resorts such as Lake Tahoe and Reno may need the sports
wagering monopoly to keep their business afloat. If sports wagering does
become legal nationwide, it could cause thousands of people to lose their jobs
within Nevada because less-prominent border casinos near Arizona and
California will likely lose significant revenue from their sports books. While
losing 2% of a business does not sound like a lot, it is enough to take notice of
New Jersey’s attempt to legalize sports wagering, and Nevada should prepare
itself for any potential changes to its major industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
PASPA has not accomplished the purposes behind its enactment. Sports
wagering is more prevalent than ever, the integrity of sports is still questioned
today, and America’s youth still engages in illegal gambling. While New Jersey
fights its five-year-long court battle, win or lose, Americans are calling for the
legalization of sports betting in the U.S. Further, because people nationwide
question PASPA’s constitutionality, and it failed to prevent the spread of sports
betting, it is unlikely to remain good law for long.
This should cause Nevada some alarm. While Nevada’s sports book
revenue only makes up approximately 2–3% of its total gaming intake, this is
still hundreds of millions of dollars in taxable revenue. Nevada losing its
monopoly on sports betting could cause towns that already have trouble
competing with neighboring state casinos, such as Lake Tahoe and Reno, to
feel an even worse economic impact. While Las Vegas will always have its
draw and charm to an international customer base, the loss of sports books in
other parts of Nevada could lead to a loss of jobs and an increase in tax burden
on people. For these reasons, Nevada should start to prepare itself for the
inevitable—the legalization of nationwide sports betting.

